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The interest in Spinoza during the last third of  the previous century
was not merely academic, and for the most part it diverged sharply
from the rationalist and idealist interpretations of  Spinoza that, at least
in France, had long managed to neutralize a thought too sulfurous to
find a place in the official edifice of  philosophy.* The originality of
this reevaluation lies in its doubly political character: in its content, as
we shall see; but also in its raisons d’être and in the significance it assumes
as we enter into a new century.
Kant or Spinoza. One could say that these two philosophers
served as flags for an entire generation of  philosophers and intellectuals
who were caught up by the vast movement of  rebellion in the sixties
and seventies and who, after the winters of  reaction and the failure of
Marxism, had to convert to surer ideals. Most of  them, anxious to
forget the harshness and cynicism of  the times by hiding behind the
moderate values and pretenses of  democracy and humanism, turned
to Kant.1 Others turned to Spinoza—the orphaned and disconsolate
Marxists who, anxious to preserve the revolutionary ideals of  their
youth and in any case accustomed to other disasters, joined the thin
ranks of  the Spinozists and Nietzscheans.
By invoking various possible libertarian readings of  Spinoza,
the study that follows has a limited aim: to give an account of  how the
principal anarchist theorists comprehended Spinoza. In a provisional
way, it will explore a dimly-sensed possibility: the possibility of  an
*This essay originally appeared as “Lectures anarchistes de Spinoza,” Rétractions 2 (Summer
1998): 119-148. It was reprinted on R.A. Forum (http://raforum.info). We thank the author
for permission to translate it here.
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encounter between anarchism and Spinozism, both from the viewpoint
of  the libertarian side, as well as from the viewpoint of  the Spinozists
least inclined to make the effort to read anarchist authors and texts.
1. Bakunin and Proudhon
Bakunin, presumably, never had the time or the will to read
Spinoza directly or thoroughly. He knows the philosopher, however.
Soemtimes he quotes him, and his most philosophical texts are not
without a trace of  Spinoza’s influence. In Bakunin, we can discern at
least two understandings of  Spinoza.
First, there is a youthful understanding, derived primarily from
the early philosophy of  Schelling,2 who, in a diffuse way, never ceased
to inspire Bakunin’s thought, as evidenced by the concept of  freedom
that Bakunin demands,3 his constant denunciation of  free will, and
especially his materialist conception of  nature and the world.
“Nature is the sum of  actual transformations of  things that
are and will be ceaselessly produced within its womb….Call it, if  you
find it amusing, God, the Absolute—it really does not matter—provided
you do not attribute to the word God a meaning different from the
one we have just established: the universal, natural, necessary, and real,
but in no way predetermined, preconceived, or foreknown combination
of  the infinity of  particular actions and reactions which all things having
real existence constantly exercise upon one another.”4
The second reference, no doubt influenced by the reading of
Proudhon, is late, explicit, and strongly critical. For Bakunin, Spinoza,
despite his pantheism, does not escape the illusions of all those—and
they are numerous—who claim to consider everything from the “point
of  view of  the absolute, or, as Spinoza said, sub specie aeternitatis,” thus
relegating man to the nothingness of  his “relative” existence.5
They begin with God, either as a person or as divine
substance or idea, and the first step that they take is a
terrible fall from the sublime heights of  the eternal ideal
into the mire of  the material world; from absolute
perfection into absolute imperfection; from thought to
being, or rather, from supreme being to nothing.6
Deus sive natura, God or nature. For Bakunin, there would
therefore be two possible readings of  Spinoza:
On the one hand, there is Spinoza the theologian—certainly
of  an unusual sort, but a theologian nevertheless—for whom God is
identified with nature, with substance, but always with the form of  a
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transcendent first principle, the absolute and infinite cause of  an infinity
of  finite beings, irremediably relegated to the nothingness of  their
finitude.
On the other hand, there is an atheist Spinoza, the silent
inspiration, via Schelling and Diderot, of  a conception of  nature in the
form of  a “universal, natural, necessary, and real, but in no way
predetermined, preconceived, or foreknown combination” of  an
“infinity of  particular actions and reactions which all things having real
existence constantly exercise upon one another”—a nature for which
it matters little if  it is called God or the absolute.
In this double and contradictory understanding of  Spinoza,
we can thus see that Bakunin anticipates the ambiguity of  contemporary
interpretations of  this philosopher, and especially of  interpretations
of  the famous formula of  the Ethics, Deus sive natura.
– God/or/nature: does this amount to two equivalent
definitions of  the same reality: substance, the infinite, absolute, remote
and vertical cause of  all that exists?7
– God/that-is-to-say/nature; is the concept of  God not, on
the contrary, only the conventional starting point of  a thought process
which transforms it into something else, into a new perception of  our
world? A radically immanent world, in which the efficient cause of  the
Scholastics transforms into self-causation,8 in which, as Bakunin wished,
necessity can finally be transformed into true freedom.9
Deus sive natura, God/or/nature. Beyond the words, it is indeed
necessary to choose, through a third possible translation of  the famous
formula of  Spinoza, a resolutely disjunctive translation, certainly an
erroneous one, but one which, paradoxically, may provide the meaning
of  Spinoza’s choices in the face of  Descartes and the thought of  his
time, the choices and the engagement underlying the current interest
in his texts and the meaning they can have for us.10
*
For a long time, Proudhon was unaware of  Spinoza. His
reading journals, carefully indexed from 1838 to 1844, never mention
him. He is absent from The Creation of  Order In Humanity (published in
1843), although this book devotes two major sections to philosophy
and metaphysics. With the exception of  a few passing allusions in the
System of  Economic Contradictions, it would take Proudhon until 1858, in
his great work on Justice in the Revolution and in the Church, to finally engage
in a critique of  Spinoza: to bring together the two thoughts, and thus
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to place them in opposition, to the best of  his ability, in a way which
expresses a direct, attentive reading of  the texts. Quoted several times,
Spinoza is the subject of  three critical developments: in the fourth
study, concerning the problem of  the State; in the seventh, with respect
to the Absolute; in the eighth, with respect to consciousness and
freedom.
Of  these three critiques, the first is certainly the quickest and
most severe. Proudhon places Spinoza beside Plato and Hegel, on the
side of  despotism.11 As a “saint of  philosophy,” persecuted by all the
religious establishments, Spinoza knew, as did Machiavelli and Hobbes,
how to free himself  from the delusions and domination of  religion.12
But “in forgetting the Gospel” he was satisfied to “relearn destiny,” the
fatum of  the Ancients, Plato’s raison d’État.13 Necessity and reason: such
is the insupportable conceptual couple reinvented by Machiavelli,
Hobbes, and Spinoza—a couple that justifies the “most appalling
despotism.”14 Indeed, because the State is governed by the principle of
necessity, it is immune to any judgment, any distinction between good
and evil. It “has the right to govern, by violence if  necessary, and to
send citizens to their deaths for the slightest causes.”15 “Balanced” only
by the hypothetical prudence of  the sovereign in the face of  a possible
revolt of  the governed, the governmental forms, long monarchical or
aristocratic, become democratic in vain, they never cease to serve the
raison d’État with political reason.16
The second critique no longer targets Spinoza’s political works,
but his Ethics, his major philosophical work. One could summarize it
by this formula of  Proudhon’s: “Spinoza…begins…with an act of
faith in the absolute.”17 Here again we find Bakunin’s critique anticipated.
As with most philosophers, Spinoza’s error is in his starting point. The
absolute, a “principle of  illusion and of  charlatanism,” can easily be
“incarnated in the person,…in the race, in the city, the corporation, the
State, the Church,” and it inevitably leads to God.18 That Spinoza, in
his Ethics, begins directly with God is thus a credit to his extreme rigor,
but it is the rigor of  a “great mind perverted by the absolute.”19
This error at the origin is not only philosophical. For Proudhon
it is directly at the root of  Spinoza’s political conceptions, of  his
inevitable celebration of despotism and raison d’État. Indeed, in the
face of  the absolute, infinite being, what can man do from his position
of  finitude, enslaved by his passions? Nothing, if  not to subject himself
to “an iron discipline organized on the double principle of  theological
reason and raison d’État.”20
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Spinoza, who believed that he was forging the ethics of
humanity, has reinvented, in more geometrico, the ethics of
the supreme Being, i.e., the system of  political and religious
tyranny under which humanity has lived for sixty centuries.
He was accused of  atheism: he is the most profound of
theologians.21
The third and perhaps most debatable critique is at the same
time the most interesting one, for three reasons: (1) because in tackling
the question of  freedom, it is at the heart of  the Spinozist problem,
the problem of  the necessity-freedom couple; (2) because, in thinking
that he has detected a contradiction in Spinoza’s system, Proudhon
opens up, in his eyes, a flaw in this system, in the necessary (and thus
despotic) sequence of  its developments; (3) because, in so doing,
Proudhon is led to clarify a whole dimension of  his own conceptions
of  freedom and, perhaps, the links between these and Spinozism.
Let us recall the essence of  Proudhon’s thesis. Faithful to his
practice of  paradox and antagonism, Proudhon attempts to
demonstrate: (1) how Descartes, favoring free will, constructs a theory
that leads to its negation; (2) how Spinoza, a denier of  free will, proposes,
on the contrary, a theory that necessarily presupposes it.22
Descartes is a philosopher of  despotism, Spinoza is a
philosopher of  freedom. Over and above the interest that such a thesis
might have for an anarchist’s ear, and before even considering the force
of  Proudhon’s insight, one can initially be surprised only by his glaring
inconsistency. Can Spinoza, the philosopher of  the absolute, of  necessity
and raison d’État, who, quite logically, denies that free will has any
meaning, be at the same time the philosopher of freedom, a freedom
inherent in his system? Drawn by his taste for provocation, Proudhon
is led to develop a paradoxical argument.
Spinoza is only the enemy of  free will because he is, in the
first place, a consistent Cartesian. In affirming with Descartes the
absolute necessity of  Being (God), Spinoza allows himself  to
demonstrate the inconsistency of  a thought that also asserts freedom,
since such a system excludes any freedom apart from that of  God
himself.23 But this inconsistency which Spinoza reveals at the origin of
Descartes’ system can also be found, reversed, in the philosophy of
Spinoza, this time under Proudhon’s inspection. How can Spinoza deny
free will, since, in the Ethics, he intends to show how the human being,
the degraded and miserable creation of  the all-powerful divine, subject
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to the fogs and mirages of  the passions, can despite everything “push
back against the tide of  necessity” that produced it, freeing itself  from
the passions that ensnare and mislead it, in order to attain a “freedom
at the expense of  the necessity to which it is subordinated”?24
It must be seen to be believed; and how can Spinoza’s
translators and critics fail to see it? The Ethics, which
everyone knows as a theory of  necessity in God, is at the
same time a theory of  man’s free will. This word is left
unstated, and it is right to say that the author does not
believe in it at all; but since when does one judge a
philosopher exclusively on his words?25
One is undoubtedly closer here to Proudhon’s insight, the
insight that Spinoza can say something other than what he seems to
say to his nineteenth century readers; the insight of  another significance
of  Spinozism, masked by the “system of  Descartes” and by two
centuries of more or less blind translations and criticisms; a significance
which appears only to the half-perspicacious eye of  Proudhon in the
form of  a contradiction—a contradiction in Spinoza, but also a
contradiction (or hesitation) in Proudhon himself. Indeed, in his
demonstrative and rhetorical ardor, Proudhon does not manage to
omit from his sentences the ambivalence that suddenly takes hold of
him. Is the assertion of  freedom (free will) that he believes he detects
in Spinoza a mere contradiction in his system, or, on the contrary, its
necessary consequence, as he says later on?26 Is Spinoza merely a disciple
of  Descartes, an intransigent and rigorous disciple who would take his
Master’s system to its extreme conclusions, or, quite to the contrary,
the ingenious inventor of  a new theory, of  an “unparalelled
originality”?27
“Since when does one exclusively judge a philosopher on his
words?” One sees more clearly, a hundred and fifty years later, the
great difficulty in which Proudhon found himself  while trying to clarify
his insight. To do this, he would have had to return to the Latin text
and give Spinoza an attention and a kind of  personal disinterestedness
which were neither in his temperament nor his habits. In particular, he
would have had to go beyond his critique of  the translators and the
critics of  his time, for in spite of  the acuity of  his gaze and his own
bloodhound or hunting-dog instincts, he was indeed doubly a prisoner
of  this translation and this criticism: a prisoner of  E. Saisset’s particularly
calamitous text;28 a prisoner of  a French interpretation of  Spinoza
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anxious to reduce him to a mere continuation of  Descartes, a celebrant
of  the absolute, an unrepentant rationalist and idealist, a pure logician,
enemy of  all experiment [expérience], of  any experimental direction.29
“Soul” for mens, “passions” for affectus, “general” for commune,
etc.: how, with such a translation, could Proudhon have failed to make
an idealistic and Christian reading of  a text which, written in Latin,
takes good care to use the vocabulary and categories of  the thought of
its time? Under Saisset’s misleading pen and Proudhon’s apprehensive
gaze, Spinoza not only appears as an heir to the Christian gnosis and its
metaphysical theory of  the Fall and Redemption;30 his thought seems
to fit naturally with a catharsis and a dualism which are equally
traditional—freedom against necessity, knowledge opposed to the
passions of  the body, the soul as a spiritual principle of  salvation and
freedom.31
It is here, however, even within his incomprehension of
Spinoza, that Proudhon’s analysis is most interesting, for the question
that it poses to him, and for the answer this question suggests:
I thus ask Spinoza: if  everything comes from divine
necessity, following which the increasingly weakened
vibrations of  this necessity gave rise to souls locked in
bondage to the passions, how can it come about that these
souls should find, by means of  their adequate ideas, more
power to return to God than they ever received from the
moment of  their existence, if  they are not in themselves
free forces?32
Free forces, free will: undoubtedly Bakunin is not entirely wrong to
reproach Proudhon for his frequent idealism, his fascination with Kant’s
categories and his annoying tendency to occasionally make
consciousness and human freedom into an a priori, transcendental,
absolute faculty.33 If  Proudhon were really to have succumbed to his
idealistic inclinations, however, it would certainly have been at the time
of his reading of Spinoza, of the rationalist and logical Spinoza that
was then in the process of  being invented within the French tradition.
Yet it is not so. Proudhon poses a completely different question to
Spinoza. He is not satisfied with the abstract freedom that Saisset’s
translation presents to him, this degree zero of  freedom that Proudhon
wryly calls “a dry communion, the hypothesis of  freedom while waiting
for freedom.”34 At the same time, however, he shows how he refuses to
be satisfied with the metaphysical void which the theory of  free will
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typically implies.35 His problem is no longer that of  free will, conceived
in the form of  an abstract, transcendental faculty, a priori and in general,
but on the contrary, in the form of  the force, or rather of  the forces,
able to produce man as a conscious and free being. Indeed, in Proudhon’s
eyes, what Spinoza’s system inexorably presupposes, like his own system,
is not the absolute, abstract, metaphysical freedom that Bakunin and
Malatesta denounce; it is forces and powers, these “free forces”
concerning which he asks Spinoza how he can ignore their existence in
conceiving human liberation.36
*
How are we to conceive of  these primary, foundational
powers? How can they themselves give life to a freedom radical enough
to deserve the name of  free will? One knows (or should know)
Proudhon’s response, which we can summarize as follows:
(1) Power and freedom are indissociable. Any power is a
freedom; any freedom is a power. And it is under this double aspect,
indissociable, that the one and the other are, together, the “prerequisite
and producer” of  any exercise of  reason.37
(2) Therefore, this power and this freedom arise neither from
an a priori transcendental faculty, nor from a primary and foundational
human nature. Like reason and like all the properties that man can
develop, they are themselves a “resultant;”38 the resultant of  a compound
of  other powers,39 themselves resulting from others compositions, other
forces, etc. Proudhon summarizes this when he says that “man is a
group.”40
(3) From which comes a Proudhonian first principle. In man,
as in all things, that which seems to be in the principle, at the beginning,
only comes afterwards, is only an effect of  composition—freedom
just as much as the soul, the faculties just as much as the ensemble of
elements or essences apparently at the origin of the human compound,
the unity of  creation just as much as the unity of  the ego.41
(4) Resulting from a sequence and a tangle of  other resultants,
human power and freedom are not therefore a single, determinate effect,
reducible to the sum of  the forces and elements which joined to produce
them. They never enter a deterministic schema of  causes and effects.
They are at the same time more and other, distinct from the forces
which render them possible.42 They are radically new.
(5) Whence comes a second assertion of  Proudhon’s. Human
power [la puissance humaine] is both a resultant and something free, at
DANIEL COLSON
98
once a radically new, autonomous reality, carrying its own force, and at
the same time the expression of  the forces and powers which, in
composing it, make it possible.43 For Proudhon, one cannot dispense
with this double assertion, intentionally paradoxical [antinomique]: the
radical autonomy of  this resultant as its own reality; the radical
dependence of  this resultant with regard to the forces that make it
possible.44
(6) One can thus understand the apparent ambiguity of
Proudhon’s formulas when, in defining human freedom, he speaks at
the same time of  free forces [forces libres] and free will [libre arbitre]. As a
power that is new with respect to the powers that make it possible,
human freedom completely justifies the recognition in oneself of the
characteristics generally attributed to the concept of  free will. Indeed,
contrary to what Bakunin thinks and to what some of  Proudhon’s
formulations suggest, the concept of  free will and the “inner sense
[sentiment intime]” that he affirms are not at all idealist.45 Their idealism is
only the effect of  their ignorance, the ignorance of  what makes them
possible, of  the forces and the play of  the composition of  forces without
which they would be nothing and of  which they are, nevertheless, the
autonomous expression.46
(7) It is in this sense, essential to all of  Proudhon’s analyses,
that human freedom or free will can also transform itself  into despotic
illusion, into an absolute which is false and authoritarian, believing itself
to be the origin of  what makes it possible, transforming the deterministic
error of  the effect into a quite as deterministic error of  the cause. The
power of  human freedom is neither an effect nor a cause but the
inevitably autonomous resultant, like any resultant, of  a compound of
forces without which it is nothing. This, for Proudhon, is what one
must understand.47
(8) Finally, Proudhon’s response reinscribes these balances and
contradictions that give his thought its force and its life at the level of
life as a whole. As a higher power, human freedom can rightfully and
absolutely claim to free itself  from all external and internal necessity,
by virtue of  the complexity and richness of  the composition that
produces it.48 It never ceases to be an integral part of  the world that
produces it and from which it seems to be so sharply separated.49 This
for four major reasons.
A. The human compound is no different in any respect from
any other compound, from all that composes nature, except in degree
of  power:
ANARCHIST READINGS OF SPINOZA
99
The living man is a group, like the plant and the crystal,
but to a higher degree than these; all the more vital,
sensitive, and intelligent since its organs, secondary groups,
form a more perfect accord with one another, and form
a vaster combination.50
B. The freedom specific to the human compound is itself
nothing more than a higher degree of  a freedom present in any
compound, however rudimentary it might be, insofar as freedom is
coextensive with the power of  the beings:
Spontaneity, to a lower degree in the unorganized beings,
to a higher degree in the plants and animals, reached, under
the name of freedom, its fullness [plénitude] in man, who
alone tends to free himself  from any fatalism, objective
as well as subjective, and who in fact does free himself.”51
C. As the resultant of  a tangle of  powers and spontaneities,
human freedom is not an end state. It is a freedom in becoming, the
intermediate degree of  a power and a higher freedom to be constructed,
beginning with all of  the powers constitutive of  the world and the play
of  composition that they permit:
In any organized or simply collective being, the resulting
force is the being’s freedom, so that the more this being,
crystal, plant or animal, approaches the human type, the
greater will be its freedom, the greater the scope of  its
free will [libre arbitre]. In man himself, free will reveals itself
all the more energetically as the elements which collectively
engender it are themselves developed in power:
philosophy, science, industry, economy, right.52
D. Inscribed within all of  the powers constitutive of  that which
exists, both a posteriori [en aval] and a priori [en amont], human freedom is
at once a part and the whole, at once “what there is of  the great in
nature” and, as Proudhon writes, “the summary of  nature, all of
nature”:53
Man—multiple, complex, collective, evolutionary—is an
integral part of  the world, which he attempts to absorb,
thereby constituting free will.54
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It is in this sense that human freedom, as conceived by
Proudhon, can break with the despotic and idealistic illusions of
Cartesian freedom and affirm itself  as revolutionary.55 It is in this sense
that Proudhon announces the anarchist conceptions to come, in
particular those of  Elisée Reclus, when Reclus affirms “the intimate
link that attaches the succession of  human acts to the action of  telluric
forces,” when he explains how “man is nature becoming aware of
itself,” but also when he affirms on the same page, more closely
approximating the thought of  Proudhon, how “it is from man that the
creative will is born that constructs and reconstructs the world.”56
Thus one knows the problem arising from Proudhon and his
way of  answering it. Even a slightly experienced reader of  Spinoza will
not fail to be struck intuitively, in a vague but definite fashion, by the
proximity (the intimacy, Bakunin would say) that links these two authors.
Which contemporary readings of  Spinoza, free from the old idealistic
and rationalist interpretations, make it possible to confirm or deny this
intuition?
2. The Marxist Interpretation
Within the current Spinoza revival, the Marxist reading
occupies a significant place, closest to the social and revolutionary
concerns of  Proudhon and with those of  libertarian thought more
generally, but also farthest from them, as we shall try to demonstrate.
The most visible difference, and undoubtedly the most determining,
relates to the link which this marxist reading claims to establish between
Spinoza’s political texts and the whole of  his philosophy. Because, from
the perspective of  this tendency, it is “thoroughly political,” Spinoza’s
thought may not be divided into purely philosophical texts and partly
circumstantial political texts.57 On the contrary, as A. Matheron
endeavours to show, only the political doctrine of  Spinoza, because it
is homologous with the structure of  the Ethics, makes it possible to
think interhuman relations and especially to build the concept of
individuality so essential to the comprehension of  Spinoza’s thought
and to the interest which we can bring to him.58 Even better, as A.
Negri demonstrates (and as one could have said of  Marx in other
times), it is in his last political work, left unfinished, aptly titled the
Treatise on Political Authority (TP), that Spinoza would finally become
himself, that, at the end of  a long process of  maturation, promises and
crises, his thought finds its completion, the ultimate foundation able to
give meaning to all of  the earlier writings.
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Undoubtedly such a political reading of  Spinoza, for which
“Spinoza’s innovation” is said to “the imagination of
communism…come true,” for which Spinozism “is a philosophy of
communism,” has all the reasons to confirm the objections of
Proudhon.59 And yet, by virtue of  its ingenuity in sometimes coming
very close to libertarian positions while at the same time moving further
away from them, this interpretation can also seem to largely satisfy the
requirements of  an anarchist reading [lecture anarchiste] in three ways.
First of  all, with regard to the question of  God and of  origin,
the basis of  the principal objections made by Proudhon and Bakunin:
against an interpretation that has largely predominated up to now, Negri’s
thesis claims precisely to show how Spinoza comes, through his work,
to free himself  from God as absolute origin. For Negri, “the Ethics
[begins] in medias res….Its abstractly foundational rhythm, then, is only
apparent. The Ethics is not in any way a philosophy of  commencement,
a philosophy of  beginning.”60
A second reason to be satisfied by the Marxist and political
interpretation of  Spinoza: the question of  force [force] and power
[puissance]. How, asked Proudhon, can Spinoza conceive the liberation
of man without necessarily presupposing the existence of free forces
capable of  such a liberation? There, too, certain of  Negri’s formulations
would seem to satisfy Proudhon’s objection completely. Human
subjectivity, collective and individual, conceived by Proudhon in the
form of  a compound of  forces and powers, corresponds, in nearly
identical terms, to the way in which Negri’s Spinoza is supposed to
think the subject and subjectivity: in the form of  a “subjective continuity”
of  the “power of  being [puissance de l’être],”61 “a powerful being, which
knows no hierarchies, which knows only its own constitutive force.”62
The third and last point of  agreement, which follows from
the previous: the refusal of  mediation. Against a traditional
interpretation which tends, in one way or another, to place Spinoza on
the side of  Hobbes or Rousseau, on the side of  the social contract and
a juridical vision of  democracy, Negri attempts to clearly establish
“Spinoza’s juridical positivism.”63 As Matheron forcefully writes in his
foreword, for Negri’s Spinoza, “right is power [le droit, c’est la puissance],
and nothing else.”64 The State (heir to the old precapitalist absolutism),
bourgeois civil society as a democratic counterweight, relations of
production as the organization and form of  coercion, et cetera: every
“mediation of  the productive forces” is radically rejected by Negri’s
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Spinoza.65 “In Spinoza there is…[no] sign of  mediation. Spinoza’s is a
philosophy of  pure affirmation…a totalizing philosophy of
spontaneity.”66 How could anarchism, which made direct action and
the refusal of  any intermediary, of  any representative, one of  the
essential axes of  its thought and its practice, fail to endorse an
interpretation for which “the denial of  the concept of  mediation itself
resides at the foundation of Spinozian thought”?67
There are thus three good reasons for libertarian thought to
endorse the Marxist interpretation of  Spinoza; but three reasons almost
too beautiful, which accentuate to the point of  caricature the features
that one usually associates with anarchism: its absolute immanentism
and the immediacy of its position and points of reference; its refusal
of  any mediation, any waiting, any regimentation, any delegation and
any representation; the exacerbated and subjective voluntarism of  a
utopian vision claiming to submit itself  to reality, immediately and
directly. Three reasons which, in their very radicality, also bring to mind
the disrepute of  a movement associated, for more than a century—
from the Marx of  The Civil War in France to Pol Pot’s Democratic
Kampuchea, passing through Lenin’s State and Revolution and the Maoist
Cultural Revolution—along with other disguisings of  its position, other
simplifications, other tinkerings with a libertarian practice and vision
all the more complex and subtle for the fact that it can attest more
visible manifestations and more current detractors.
*
Without entering into an exhaustive discussion of  Negri’s
analyses, it suffices to observe how, in their approach and their
conclusions, they tend to verify Proudhon’s worst fears. In media res,
begin in the middle of  things, A. Negri tells us; and, more precisely,
begin from multiplicity, the “particular beings” which populate the
“world of  modes.”68 But against the radicality of  this first and this
second assertion, which are not the subject of  any consequent
development, is opposed at once the negative abstraction, every bit as
radical but now developed at length, of  the third: the refusal of  any
mediation. A violent and absolute refusal which quickly leads Negri,
thus without transition, to affirm the “unity” and “univocity of  being,”
of  which all of  these “things” are no more than the “emanation,” to
affirm the “absoluteness of  the potentiality of  being,” as well as the
“source” of  “the thousand and one singular actions of  each being,” to
affirm the “density,” the “totality” and the “centrality” of  a single being
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of  which the modes are no more than “forms,” “variations,” and
“figures,” to affirm the “transparency” and the “unifying force” of
being, in short, to unceasingly affirm and reaffirm “being” or the
“divine” as the “expression of  infinite power.”69
Between the modes and the substance there is nothing. Such
is Negri’s thesis about Spinoza. Or rather—and it is here that Negri’s
assertions, so ostensibly libertarian, move infinitely far away from the
anarchist project—in this “nothing,” there is the politics that justifies
and necessitates political power, the absolute power of  politics, the
political absolute denounced by Proudhon, this almost-nothing that
does everything and that makes all the difference to the libertarian
project. In a deafening theoretical echo of  the Maoism of  the Cultural
Revolution, Negri refuses any mediation of  being, but only the better
to entrust to politics the frightening prerogative, not only of
“mediat[ing]” its power and its truth, but also of  “constituting” it as
“power” and as “truth,” of  giving it its “existence,” through its most
perfect “constitution,” this “revolution” without “becoming” which is
the “omnino absolutum imperium” of  “democracy.”70
In Negri’s Spinoza, “being” and “political subjectivity” are
only the two faces of  one inescapable sequence of  thought, a thought
based on the double absolute of  religion and politics, the necessary
and the arbitrary, of  “absolute necessity” as the absolute justification
of  an absolute arbitrariness;71 an absolute in the mirror in which
communist being realizes itself, in the flawless ballet of  the politics that
embodies it directly, in which things and men are actually condemned
to take part in most appalling of  despotisms, with the harmony or
(according to the moments) with the mass punishment of political
orchestration of  bodies and souls which tolerates no variation, no gaps,
no hesitation, no fumbling, no disagreement, no crisis, no inevitably
negative criticism, no inevitably dubious history, no inevitably groping
experiment, in short, no becoming.
As Negri writes:
The contemporaneity of  Spinoza consists first of  all in
this: being does not want to be subjected to a becoming
that does not possess truth.72 Truth is said of  being, truth
is revolutionary, being is already revolution….Becoming
manifests its falsity when faced with the truth of  our
revolutionary being. It is not by chance that, today,
becoming seeks to destroy being and suppress truth.
Becoming seeks to annihilate the revolution…a crisis is
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always a negative violation of  being, set against its power
of  transformation.73
And it is spontaneously and without surprise that Negri’s revolutionary
enthusiasm joins again, naturally, with the religious gestures of
submission to the absolute that Proudhon and Bakunin had been so
quick to find in Spinoza:
The world is the absolute. We are happily overwhelmed
by this plenitude, we cannot help but associate ourselves
with this superabundant circularity of  sense and existence.
‘You spare all things because all things are yours, Lord,
lover of  life/you whose imperishable spirit is in all.’….Such
is the content of  being and revolution.74
Within the framework of  this study, it is not possible or even useful to
analyze in detail the dead end and the impotence of  a interpretation
which, through the concepts of  the multitude, the imagination, and
the individual, struggles vainly to give any material content to the politics
of  the “constitution” of  “being.” Faithful to the despotic tradition to
which he adheres, Negri himself  is happy to mask the terrifying void
of  his political conception behind a interminable pedagogical evaluation
of  the progress and regress of  Spinoza along the way to the truth:
through “discrimination[s]” and “caesura[s],” “limits” and
“interruption[s],” “destruction[s]” and “reconstruction[s],” “decisive
choice[s]” and “critical threshold[s]”; but also “cris[es]” and
“intermediate moment[s],” “block[ages]” and “leap[s] forward”; or,
“approximations” and “weak” moments, “confusions and
dissymmetries,” “step[s] backward” and “slippage[s],” “uncertaint[ies],”
and “intrasystemic disequilibri[a]”; and then again, “retreats” and
“banalit[ies],” “ambiguit[ies]” and “confusion[s],” “reversal[s]” and
“residual elements,” etc.,75 in preparation for the final silence of  the
incompletion of  the TP, where, with a show of  false regret, the
“imagination” of  the revolutionary leaders (and other Pol Pots of  being)
can finally deploy itself  without obstruction.
Proudhon reproached Spinoza for three things: (1) taking God,
the absolute, as his starting point; (2) linking his political conceptions
to this metaphysics of  the absolute, thereby leading to the most
“appalling of despotisms”; (3) being unable to account for the freedom
which, paradoxically, his system necessarily presupposes. Under the
pomp of  its revolutionary proclamations, the Marxist interpretation
can only confirm—with a strange power, one might say—the first two
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objections. But in so doing, the Marxist interpretation, like Proudhon’s,
can only run up against the third, a rather wrongheaded objection,
which is astonished by Spinoza’s very text, by what it “incredibly”
continues to say in spite of  what it seems to say, in spite of  what one
makes it say; a perverse and stifling [entêtée et entêtante] objection that
even Negri cannot prevent himself  from opposing to his own
conclusions:
If, as Spinoza would like, democracy is an ordered system
constitutive of  absoluteness [this is Negri’s thesis], how
can it simultaneously be a regime of  freedom? How can
freedom become a political regime without repudiating
its own naturalness?76
Or again, in terms almost identical to those of  Proudhon’s critique:
How can a philosophy of  freedom be taken up again in
an absolute form of  government; or, vice-versa, how can
an absolute form of  power be compatible with a
philosophy of  freedom…how can absoluteness and
freedom be made compatible?77
And, a little further on:
“Do we not perhaps find ourselves in the presence of  a
totalitarian utopia…[in which] every distinction and
determination vanishes?78
It would be difficult to state more forcefully the need for another
interpretation of  Spinoza.
3. Another Reading of  Spinoza
In a recent text, A. Matheron, one of  those who, well before
Negri, contributed to the further development of  a political and marxist
reading of  Spinoza, provides, after years of  research and interrogation,
an ultimate explanation of  the incompletion of  the TP, the non-writing
of  the final section on democracy which, according to Negri, is
supposed, even by its absence, to give the direction of  the whole of
Spinoza’s philosophical direction.79 In a slightly disillusioned way, A.
Matheron wonders whether Spinoza, in his concern for intervening
effectively in the political struggles of  his time, did not hesitate to reveal
a terrifying truth: not, as Negri thinks, the joyous secret of  the liberation
and revolution to come, but, on the contrary, and in an indisputably
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anarchist sense this time, the overpowering certainty that “at the very
root” of  political society and the State there is “something irremediably
bad.”80 For the belatedly anarchist Spinoza of  Matheron, and against
the communist Spinoza of  Negri, nothing is to be expected from
politics, even of  the democratic variety, since “the elementary form of
democracy, according to Spinoza, is lynching,” and the “power of  the
multitude” only seeks to ensure the safety of  “conformists” and to
repress “deviants.”81 Consequently, only a “community of  the wise”
could lay claim to a collective life liberated from fear and obedience,
but, as A. Matheron remarks, “we would have a democracy without an
imperium then, and it would not really be a State any more.”82 Thus,
anarchy.
Beyond the easy irony that the logical spirit of  theoretical
Marxism never fails to evoke, A. Matheron’s final conclusion, which,
like the straw that broke the camel’s back, topples thirty heavy years of
the political interpretation of  Spinoza, at least presents the novelty of
reminding us that another reading of this philosopher is possible; a
reading that, to begin with, would attempt to rigorously distinguish
what Marxist interpretation attempts to confuse: to separate the political
writings (with their rather particular reasons for being) from the Ethics
and the other philosophical works (with their own radically different
ends),83 separating the “absolute form of  power,” which one can indeed
deduce from the former, from the “philosophy of  freedom” proper to
the latter.
As G. Deleuze recalls, because it is subject “to an extrinsic
order, determined by passive feelings of  hope and fear,” and founded
on obedience, commandment and interdiction, sin and guilt, merit and
demerit, good and evil, political society, no matter how good it may be,
can in no case have the same goal as the philosopher.84
It is certain that the philosopher finds the most favorable
conditions in the democratic state and in liberal circles.
But he never confuses his purposes with those of  a state,
or with the aims of a milieu, since he solicits forces in
thought that elude obedience as well as blame, and fashions
the image of  a life beyond good and evil, a rigorous
innocence without merit or culpability. The philosopher
can reside in various states, he can frequent various milieus,
but he does so in the manner of  a hermit, a shadow, a
traveler or boarding house lodger.85
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It is true, if  one excludes the explicit reference to Nietzsche, that
Deleuze’s distinction can itself  seem to fall under a completely traditional
interpretation of  Spinoza, with a program for the multitude, the crowd,
and the vulgar on one side, irremediably subject to passion and to
imagination, whom a “civilizing” State must guide and manipulate from
the outside, and on the other side, the few, the elite of  philosophers,
hermits and unattached individuals, only able to accede to reason by
themselves, inwardly, by the force of  thought and even by their solitude.86
A heretic for Yovel, a deviant for Matheron, a grand vivant for
Deleuze, anxious to invent a new man to break with the man of  the
masses, the plebs, the crowd, and the herd, undoubtedly the Spinozist
philosopher can claim, from Max Stirner to Michel Onfray, from
Nietzsche and Jean-Marie Guyau to Albert Libertad and Georges
Palente, to echo an entire dimension of  anarchism: its individualistic
dimension. But how, from the libertarian point of  view, could this
absolute opposition of  the individual to the social open up to an
interpretation of  Spinoza which, while relativizing or leaving behind
the political writings, would attempt to find in the individuality of  the
philosopher the place and principle of  a collective emancipation of
humanity? By what paradox of  libertarian thought is it that politics per
se—the action of  the mass, the multitude (thought under the negative
sign of  communism, despotism and conformism)—is precisely what
collective liberation must get away from, making its way instead via the
exigencies and possibilities of  individual liberation?
One saw how Proudhon endeavoured to think this paradox,
in particular through his refusal to oppose the individual and the group,
through his conception of  the individual as composed of  powers and
his assertion that the individual is a group.87 However, in another way,
he is no less on the side of  various interpretations of  Spinoza, where
the multitude and the individual (in the modern sense of  the term) are
not necessarily where one initially thinks to locate them.
Communism and the multitude of  individuals
A paradox of  the political interpretation first of  all, centered
on the emergence of  politics and its “constitution of  being”: an
emergence that is yet to come, since it is identified with the revolution,
and a constitution as a “project” that can find its full and true expression
only in the vacuum and incompletion of  the TP.88 Projected into the
future, it is quite necessary, however, that this constitution have a present
and a past (or some antecedent) that justify one’s speaking of  it in the
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present, that can materially found the future existence of  the multitude.
Negri endeavours to grasp this present and this past, as the genesis of
what is being born, as a striving towards the future, through what he
calls a genealogy: the “genealogy of  collectivity.”89
This genealogy presents two faces. In the first place, it follows
Spinoza’s path, the trajectory of  a difficult and discontinuous search,
from the “positive utopia,” the “mystical” and “pantheist” utopia of
the Short Treatise, to the incompletion of  the TP, passing through a
sometimes recurring succession of  “metaphysical,” “physical,”
“baroque” and “mystical” conceptions. Inevitably retrospective, and
although it is central to The Savage Anomaly, this chronological reading
of  the path or, rather, the paths followed by Spinoza in his search for
being, is however not yet, to be strictly accurate, the “genealogy of
collectivity” that Negri claims to bring to light.90 Pedagogical and
interpretive, he aims above all at showing how Spinoza becomes
Spinoza.91 A rigorous pre-genealogy, or a negative genealogy,92 this
reading painstakingly follows Spinoza’s process of  becoming, from
one crisis to the next, because it knows the end of  the story, and therefore
it can patiently accept the mistakes and deviations that any process of
becoming entails, with its “impasse[s]” and its “blocking[s],” its
“approximations” and its “weaknesses,” its “ambiguities” and its
“confusions,” its “uncertainties” and other “errors,” “enigmas” and
“hypostases.”93 It can in no way be confused with the genealogy of
collectivity and the revolution, for which it is satisfied, at best, to prepare
the way, as John the Baptist prepared the way for Christ.
In Negri’s analysis, the true Spinozist genealogy of  collectivity
and revolution are to be found elsewhere. He begins where Spinoza’s
search ends, in 1664 or 1665 to be precise, at the moment of  the second
Anglo-Dutch war, when, straying into contradictions and the pantheist
labyrinth of  the end of  book II of  Ethics, he makes a true epistemological
break.94 At this point in time, Spinoza finally discovers what he had
anticipated since the beginning, what he had sought for such a long
time: the importance of  politics, and more precisely still, of  the “subject”
of political action.
Indeed, with the drafting of the TP and its supposed
philosophical translation into books III and IV of  the Ethics, it is not
only politics and its phenomenology, full of  fury and superstitions,
that irrupt into Spinoza’s system. The essential innovation, the
“ontological inversion” that, for Negri, finally yields the possibility of  a
true genealogy of  collectivity, is the revelation of  the “subject” of  this
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political action;95 it is the invention of  “human individuality” as the
primary condition and foundation of  the multitude and thus of  the
constitution of  being.96 For Negri, with the TP and books III and IV
of  the Ethics, Spinoza at last (not without relapses) escapes from the
pantheist, naturalist, physical and metaphysical fogs of  his former
attempts. He can finally “pass” from “physics…into physiology and
[from] physiology into psychology”; he can finally traverse “the
genealogy of  consciousness,” passing “from conatus to the subject”.97
Abandoning the vast pantheist horizons and metaphysics of  the world
and nature, “Potentia, the general figure of  Being,” finally condenses
into cupiditas, this human form of  the conatus, and “invests the world of
historical passions and relations”; while waiting for the TP to complete
this first genealogy and show, even by its incompletion, how, starting
from this “constitution of  the individual,” these “formed individuals,”
these “individual powers” (“this first level of  socialization”),
“Sovereignty and Power” are finally “flattened onto the multitudo and
onto the processes that proceed from individuals to the constitution
of  the State.”98
Here is the paradox of  the political interpretation of  Spinoza:
while believing that it opens onto the infinity of  the multitude, it locks
itself  up in the dubious straightjacket of  the individual.99 The collective
infinite changes into the indefinite.100 And the definite is limited to the
conceptual poverty of  a subject reduced to a word-for-word reiteration
of  the moral treatises of  seventeenth century.101
Anarchy and multiple individuality
If  the paradox of  the political multitude is to be thought
starting from the individual, on the quantitative register of  the same
(communism), one could say that the paradox of  the philosopher’s
“individuality” is to be thought starting from the multiple, on the
qualitative register of  the different (anarchy).
To properly understand the sense (physical and conceptual)
of  this double paradox, it is necessary to cross two centuries, to go for
a moment to the Ukraine, where anarchy and communism clashed
directly. In the book Arshinov wrote in 1921 on the Makhnovist
libertarian movement, in the heat of  the action, after four years of
cruel and complicated struggle on the immense plains of  the Ukraine,
he concludes thus, solemnly, in counterpoint to the old slogan of  the
First International: “Proletarians of  the world, look into the depths of
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your own beings, seek out the truth and realize it yourselves: you will
find it nowhere else.”102
By its strangeness, this call rather aptly expresses the direction
taken by another reading of  Spinoza, a reading that appears strictly
philosophical and individual, that seems to want to turn away from
politics itself  while at the same time it announces a collective project
of  an altogether different nature.103
As the antiquated psychological foundation of  a hypothetical
collective future, the human individual postulated by the political Spinoza
is first of  all an end, as one has just seen, a goal long sought for, something
promised for the future, but one that, once found, effaces the long
wanderings that preceded it. The other interpretation is precisely the
reverse of  this. In place of  a political reading that starts from the vast
spaces of  Spinoza’s thought, only to transform them into simple
horizons and to end up in the walled garden of  human passions, the
philosophical and libertarian interpretation of  Spinoza begins with the
human individual, with the apparent simplicity and banality of  its
psychological operation, only to open it up to the vastness of  the nature
of  which it is only a part, to the infinity of  that which exists and what
it is capable of.104 Fortitudo (with its double aspect of  Animositas and
Generositas), Titillatio, Presentia Animi, Humanitas, etc., the long list of  the
definitions (more than seventy) that help Spinoza to grasp the nuances
of  the human experience, may well be borrowed from the most current
representations of  the seventeenth century, from the most worn moral
treatises and from the voluntarily mechanical use of  the theory of  the
passions.105 Like the scholastic concepts or the very ordinary Latin that
Spinoza employs, they are used for very different ends, opening onto
very different realities than what their psychological banality might lead
us to believe. It is in this sense (among others) that Spinoza can be
brought closer to Nietzsche:
The philosopher appropriates the ascetic virtues—
humility, poverty, chastity—and makes them serve ends
completely his own, extraordinary ends that are not very
ascetic at all, in fact. He makes them the expression of  his
singularity….Humility, poverty, chastity are his (the
philosopher’s) way of  being a grand vivant, of  making a
temple of  his own body, for a cause that is all too proud,
all too rich, all too sensual.106
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“Proletarians of  the world, look into the depths of  your own beings!”
The point of  arrival in the Marxist interpretation, the point of  departure
in the philosophical and libertarian interpretation, the human individual
and its passions occupy more than one position contested by the
different readings of  Spinoza.107 To this difference in place correspond
other oppositions that bear first of  all on the nature of  this individuality
and the orientation in time of  the process of  transformation in which
it is engaged.
First, the orientation in time. If  the political Spinoza proceeds
in two definitely distinct times, from the initial pantheism to the
individual, then from the individual to the multitude, these two
movements work in the same direction, so that the time of  things
comes to coincide with the time of  thought, from the past towards the
future, from the beginning to the end, from the naturalist and
metaphysical origin of  being to its political constitution, “from nature
to second nature, from physics to human action,” from the infinite
foundation of things and of signs (this “dark complexion” of existence
of  which Negri speaks) to the narrow, closed field of  human desires,
to the battlefield of  politics, where, in a cri du coeur, Negri dreams of
one day seeing the “infinite” finally submitted to “organization.”108
The direction taken by the philosophical and libertarian
Spinoza is of  a radically different nature. Foreign to a linear conception
of  time, in which Macherey has no trouble recognizing, in spite of
Negri’s denials, the deeply Hegelian vision of  Marxism,109 he sets a very
different time to work, multiple and qualitative, which is due to the
duration of  things, “to the reality of  enduring things” of  which B.
Rousset speaks,110 and to the relations of  composition, recombination,
and decomposition which increase, decrease, or destroy these existing
things’ power to act.111 If  it were necessary, at any cost, in order to be
able to compare them, to translate the duration of  the libertarian Spinoza
onto the temporal register of  the political Spinoza, it would be necessary
to speak of  an a posteriori and an a priori. Whereas the political Spinoza
proceeds from a priori to a posteriori, from the foundation of things to
individuals, then from individuals to the multitude, one could say that
the other Spinoza operates from a posteriori to a priori, from individuals
such as they exist at present towards what constitutes them as individuals,
from the closed field of  political passions towards the obscure and
infinite foundation of the realities that they mask, from the immediate
given towards the infinity from which it results as a finite composition
and thus as a singular expression of  an infinite otherness.
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The philosophical and libertarian Spinoza claims the revolution
no less than does his political brother-enemy, but for him, the revolution
to come is not a posteriori, in the emptiness and arbitrariness of a political
constitution the materiality of  which would be reduced to the passions
of  human nature. It is a priori, in the infinity of  “possibilities,” the
present forms of  individuation of  which are only an actual expression,
a point of  departure.112 As B. Rousset attempts to show, contrary to the
emptiness and material poverty of  the political imagination, these
possibilities or potentials, prior to the human individual, the foundation
of  that of  which it is capable, are neither the unreal and erroneous
products of  the imagination nor mere virtualities (in the scholastic
sense of  the term).113 As “practical theses,” “real possibilities,” they are
“implied” in the “being inhexhaustible” in which the human experience
unfolds.114 They exist “by implication” in one duration which is identified
with “movement” and “life,” or, in the vocabulary of  Deleuze, with a
“plane of  immanence or consistency, which is always variable and is
constantly being altered, composed and recomposed, by individuals
and collectivities.”115
If the Spinozist possibility can thus be thought prior to the
current moment, and if  the Spinozist future can be thought in the
past, this is absurd or paradoxical only on the register of  linear or
dialectical time (so foreign to Spinoza). In the libertarian interpretation
of  Spinozist duration, past and future, the a priori and the a posteriori,
merge in an untimely present in which all is given, in which duration
depends on the multiplicity of  things, virtual and formal, in which,
contrary to the scholastic meaning of  these terms, the virtual is no less
real than the formal, the power no less real than the act.116 It is in this
sense that the Spinozist “foundation” and the libertarian “depths” of
which Arshinov and Proudhon speak, are very precisely a surface, an
already-there [déja-la], a present, patient and impatient, in which
everything is always there as possible, a present in which “all is possible.”
It is also in this sense, on the side of  or parallel to libertarian thought
itself, that Spinoza can be related to the very Leibnizian G. Tarde, for
whom it is appropriate to refuse to consider being or the individual as
“foundational [souches premières]”, as some “absolutely primary given,”
but only as some presently existing “emergents” from an infinity of
other possible emergents, other “possibilities,” struggling with one
another to exist.117 It is in this sense, finally, closest to us, that Spinoza’s
conceptions can be linked to an entire dimension of  the thought of  G.
Simondon, for whom “the individuation of  beings does not completely
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exhaust the potentials of  the individuation,” for whom “the
individual….exists as superior to itself  because it contains within itself
a more complete reality that the process of individuation did not exhaust,
that remains new and potential, animated by potentials”; a reality that
G. Simondon calls “nature,” i.e. the “reality of  the possible, under the
species of  that apeirôn from which Anaximander draws each individual
form.”118
We do not even know what a body is capable of. Balibar is
right to emphasize, contra Negri, the respect in which Spinoza’s concept
of  human individuality is in no way comparable to a subject, a
consciousness or a person. He is right to explain why the object of  the
Ethics is not the individual (in the modern sense of  the term), but “the
form of  individuality”; he is right to affirm, like Proudhon, that “all human
individuality is caught up…in the in-between of  the inferior forms of
individuality that are composed in it—but whcih are not for all that
dissolved in it—and of  the superior forms of  individuality into which
it can enter.”119
But Balibar was wrong to reduce this immense play of  the
composition of  possible individuals to the narrow passional and
affective field of  interhuman relations (the theory of  the passions), to
entrust to it, not without a certain inexactness, the care of  constituting
human subjectivity in a transversal fashion, thinking thereby to assure,
better than Negri, the transition from the multitude to politics.120
Because they are grasped not in the in-between [entre-deux]
but in the in-between-thousands [entre-mille] of  all the other relations
and individuals that comprise human nature, the human passions are
no more “a kingdom within a kingdom” than the individualities that
they affect.121 Because they are taken on between the inferior forms of
individualities which are composed in them and the superior forms of
individuality into which they can enter, the various human individuals
are themselves only a modality of  the infinite forms of  individuals
which, to differing degrees and through successive agreements, compose
the existing world.122 “That is why Spinoza calls out to us in the way he
does: you do not know beforehand what a body or a soul can do, in a
given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination.”123
*
In the foreword which he gave to the French translation of
Negri’s book, Deleuze thus summarizes his own manner of  reading
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and of  understanding Spinoza and, in a certain way, taking into account
the circumstances, his own way of  conceiving Spinoza’s politics:
Bodies (and souls) are forces. As such they are not only
defined by their chance encounters and collisions (state
of  crisis). They are defined by relationships between an
infinite number of  parts that compose each body and
that already characterize it as a ‘multitude.’ There are
therefore processes of  composition and decomposition of
bodies, depending on whether their characteristic
relationships suit them or not. Two or several bodies will
form a whole, in other words, another body, if  they
compose their respective relationships in concrete
circumstances. And it is the highest exercise of  the
imagination, the point where it inspires understanding, to
have bodies (and souls) meet according to composable
relationships.124
It is undoubtedly in this text, collected and abstracted and yet so
Proudhonian in its form and content, that the meeting between a
philosophical and libertarian reading of  Spinoza and the anarchist
thought itself  appear most clearly; in three great ways:
(1) First of  all, in connection with the multitude. No doubt
the quotation marks that Deleuze employs serve to mark a certain
distance, to mean that it is about a notion specific to the author whom
he prefaces and that this word is not among Spinoza’s principal
concepts.125 But they also serve to show how, by employing the word
multitude and by reintroducing it to the heart of  Spinoza’s philosophy,
Deleuze transforms its initial political significance completely. If, for
Proudhon, the individual is a group, a compound of  forces or powers
which differs from all the other compositions (minerals, plants and
animals) only in degree, the Spinoza of  Deleuze does not say
otherwise.126 With Proudhon and against Negri, the multitude ceases
to be the hypothetical and imperceptible horizon of  a revolution to
come; it is already there, at hand, in us and around us. The multitude is
no longer the final and unifying synthesis of  all the human individualities
led by only one soul, on the side of  the infinitely large (the “constitution
of  being”); it is geared down in an infinity of  multitudes, inside an
infinity of  body and hearts, on the side of  an infinity of  infinitely small
things.127 Better still, because it is interior to each body and each soul,
therefore with all the bodies and all the souls, the multitude ceases
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being attached to only human realities, human individuality and the
narrowness of  its passions. Interior to any thing, it embraces the totality
of  bodies and souls, the totality of  individualities, whether they are
human or non-human.
(2) Secondly, force. “Bodies (and souls) are forces,” Deleuze
tells us, and it is “as such” (a) that by relationship between an infinity
of  parts they are defined as multitude; (b) that they are grasped (soul
and body) in some “processes of composition and
decomposition…depending on whether their characteristic
relationships suit them or not.” In short, this force that Proudhon
demands from Spinoza, which he himself  identifies with the resultant
of  a compound, and which, for Negri, is transformed into an abstract
and general entity (the “power of  being”), Deleuze reinscribes at the
center of  Spinoza’s analyses, in each body (and in each soul) and in the
most material sense possible (physical, chemical, biological).
Thanks to force and the multitude, the Spinoza of  Deleuze
reunites what the political interpretation of  Spinoza had endeavoured
to separate, nature and second nature (Negri), the human and the non-
human (Matheron):128 “One Nature for all bodies, one Nature for all
individuals, a Nature that is itself  an individual varying in an infinite
number of  ways.”129
Again, as Deleuze says, the “plane of  Nature…does not make
any distinction at all between things that might be called natural and
things that might be called artificial.”130 Plane of  immanence and unity
of  composition,131 or, in the vocabulary of  Bakunin this time, the
“universal…combination of  the infinity of  particular actions and
reactions which all things having real existence incessantly exercise upon
one another,”132 the processes of  composition and decomposition of
bodies and souls, all correspond to a physico-chemical model, whether
they are human or not.133 Even the common notions which, starting
from what is most universal, command the rational and geometrical
architecture and development of  the Ethics, are also, in their construction,
not only a “mathematics of  the real or the concrete,” but specifically
“physico-chemical or biological Ideas rather than geometric ones.”134
And ethics itself, this specificity of  the human power, is also, in its
origins as well as in its applications, a “test” of  a physico-chemical
type.135
(3) Finally, freedom. Reduced to that which exists, to the a
priori of  possibilities, the various forms of  the individualities which can
cover human existence can well embrace the infinite totality of  material
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determinations, to be material throughout. Contrary to appearances
and to the a priori idealists of  dualistic thought, they are not in any way
reduced to natural forces, to the non-human (even to the inhuman).
Quite to the contrary; it is thanks to this persistent return to that which
founds and constitutes his existence, to the material infinity of
possibilities, that man can claim to reach a world of  freedom, in a
human world, a world to himself, a world where, ceasing to be separated
from his force, he finally becomes master of  his power to act. As Deleuze
writes, “What defines freedom is an ‘interior’ and a ‘self ’ determined
by necessity….Man, most powerful of  the finite modes, is free when
he comes into possession of  his power of  acting.”136 Power, freedom,
power to act, interior, “self ”: even if  the theoretical references are
different, we thus find Proudhon’s vocabulary and prospects: “If  man
thinks for himself, if  he produces his ideas as his right, he is free.”137
Such is the goal for Proudhon as well as for the Spinoza of
Deleuze, the Spinoza of  knowledge through common notions.138 And
the question that this common goal implies is also the same: how to
think for oneself? How to produce one’s ideas and one’s right?139 For
the Spinoza of  Deleuze, signs and experience are required: signs or
ideas as “dark precursors” of the common notions;140 experience or
experimentation as the precondition for any thought, for any
reappropriation of  power, and thus for any freedom.141 For Proudhon,
signs and action are needed: signs or ideas which are certainly a priori
untrue and a source of  slavery, but the origins of  which can be found
and which, brought back to that which produces them (acts, facts,
instinctive thought), can make it possible for man to free himself  and
to think for himself;142 action as the condition of signs and thought, as
foundation of  power and freedom.143 In both cases the process is the
same: to start with signs as an immediate condition and to arrive at a
thought that is free and for itself  [par soi-même] (or, for Deleuze, in itself
[en soi]), but to do so in order to get back at once to the source of  all
thought and all freedom: experimentation for Spinoza, action for
Proudhon and, after him, the principal currents of  the libertarian
movement.
It is true that Proudhon (in De la Justice at least) tends to link
this action exclusively to labor, “one and identical in its plane [and]
infinite in its applications, like creation itself,”144 whereas for the Spinoza
of  Deleuze the “plane” of  human experience, the “plane of  immanence
or consistency, which is always variable,” is “Nature” as a whole.
However, in these two approaches, as different as they can be otherwise,
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it is a matter of: 1) locating this experience or this human action on an
infinite plane of composition, through relations that Spinoza calls
common notions (thoughts on a physico-chemical and biological model)
and that Proudhon calls elements of  knowledge or elements of  labor
(thought on a physico-mathematical model instead);145 2) bringing back
these experiments or these actions of  composition to the forms of
interiority, increasingly broader and more complex, which constitute
the human compounds; for the Spinoza of  Deleuze, by selection,
selection of  the “bodies that agree with our own and give us joy, that is,
that increase our power”;146 for Proudhon, by the interiorization of  the
relations of  labor, an interiorization that dates from time immemorial
(at the origin of  humanity as well as of  each individual) but which is
continually repeated, spreading to cover the infinite plane of
composition of  human industry.147
A body and a soul among other bodies and souls, but “the
most powerful of  the finite modes,” and “free when it comes into
possession of  its power of  acting,” man thus has the capacity to
experiment, to learn to know what is good and bad for its power to act,
for its freedom.148 And it is through this experimentation with the
relations that agree with it, at the interior and on the exterior of  what
constitutes it, with refusals and approvals, with yes and no, with
associations that are always revocable, that it can extend these relations
to increasingly vast forms of  association, disposing of  an ever more
“intense” power, no longer concerned with instrumentalizations or
appropriations, but with sociabilities and communities.149
In contrast to the political city of  which Negri dreams, the
philosophical and libertarian emancipation that one can read in Spinoza
then ceases to be founded on fear or anguish, reward and punishment.
As Proudhon and Bakunin wished, it ceases to rely on the State, trusting
the State to “[take] the place of  reason for those who have none,” i.e.,
for the majority, for the slaves.150 Renouncing any external coercion,
even when this calls itself  enlightened, emancipation can emerge from
“relations that directly and naturally combine,” from “powers or rights
that are naturally additive.”151 It can claim to emerge directly from
individuals and collectivities (which are themselves collectivities of
individuals), from their capacity to transform, compose, and recompose
ad infinitum the “plane of  immanence or consistency, which is always
variable,” of  that which exists.152
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